Photo of Danielle Andrews Long

Danielle Andrews Long is a member of Robinson+Cole’s Appellate Team.  She has a significant amount of experience in all aspects of the Massachusetts appeals process – from pinpointing potential appeal issues, drafting appeal briefs (both appellant and appellee), preparing interlocutory appeals, preparing petitions for further appellate review and direct appellate review, and arguing appeals. Danielle has argued appeals before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and Appeals Court. Danielle's experience encompasses her own matters that she has litigated prior to the appeal process and matters for which she has been specifically retained to pursue an appeal. She has experience with Massachusetts state court appeals from decisions in the Land Court and Superior Courts, Massachusetts District Court appeals to the First Circuit, and Massachusetts Bankruptcy appeals to the District Court and First Circuit. Her appellate experience includes a wide variety of substantive areas, including real estate, land use, products liability, construction, and legal malpractice cases.

On November 7, 2016, the Appeals Court heard oral argument for Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Ryan Casey & Another (16-P-32).  Defendants Ryan Casey and Evan Williams appealed a Superior Court’s summary judgment decision in favor of Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) that concluded that the insured, Casey, expected or intended to cause William’s bodily injury as a matter of law. The Superior Court held that Liberty Mutual had no duty to defend or indemnify Casey or pay William’s medical expenses due to an exclusion in the policy for bodily injury “which is expected or intended by the insured.” The Appeals Court upheld the Superior Court’s decision on March 29, 2017.

William and Casey got into an altercation in a remote location. Casey punched and kicked Williams numerous times, leaving him seriously injured. Casey was indicted for the attacks and pled guilty to assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery causing serious bodily harm. He was sentenced to a house of correction for 2 ½ years and probation.  Williams made a claim under Casey’s parent’s homeowner’s insurance policy with Liberty Mutual. The policy contained certain exclusions that stated that certain coverages did not apply to “’bodily injury’…[w]hich is expected or intended by the ‘insured’, even if the resulting ‘bodily injury’ . . . is of a different kind, quality, or degree than initially expected or intended.” It is that clause that the Superior Court judge determined excluded coverage for Casey and Williams.
Continue Reading Intent to Injure Can Be Inferred as a Matter of Law Barring Coverage Under a Homeowner’s Policy for Bodily Injury Expected or Intended by an Insured

On June 7, 2016, the Appeals Court heard oral argument for Harvard Climate Justice Coalition v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (AC 15-P-0905). Harvard Climate Justice Coalition, an unincorporated association of students at Harvard University (“Students”), appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing their action for a permanent injunction requiring the President and Fellows

On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument for Bank of America, N.A. v. Debora A. Casey (In re Pereira), 791 F.3d 180 (1st Cir. 2015). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified the following questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:

  1. May an affidavit executed and

In Bank of America, N.A. v. Debora A. Casey (In re Pereira), 791 F. 3d 180 (1st Cir. 2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified the following questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:

  1. May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant to G.L. c 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the mortgagor, correct what the parties say is a material defect in the Certificate of Acknowledgment of that mortgage?
  1. May an affidavit executed and recorded pursuant to G.L. c 183, § 5B, attesting to the proper acknowledgment of a recorded mortgage containing a Certificate of Acknowledgment that omits the name of the mortgagor, provide constructive notice of the existence of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage?

Continue Reading Can an Attorney’s Affidavit Cure a Defective Mortgage?